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
Executive Registry
65-3887

DD/S&T #3125-65
8 July 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: NSAM 300: Review of Alternate Communications, Navigation, Missile and Space Tracking and Data Acquisition Facilities
REFERENCE: Memorandum from DDCI dated 22 July 1964 to D/DCI/NIPE and SA/DDS&T, ER 64-5051/1

1. This memorandum is for information and requires no action on your part.
2. As instructed by reference, I represented the Director in the NSAM 300 Working Group, chaired by Mr. Joseph Wolf, Department of State. My status in the Working Group was that of an observer. The NSAM 300 final report was forwarded to Mr. McGeorge Bundy on 17 May 1965. A copy is attached for information.
3. At the request of Mr. Thomas Hughes, DD/I submitted an assessment of the risks of losing certain U.S. space tracking facilities in Latin America (page 13, Attachment B), and at my request DD/OC, after review, revised certain statements in the draft on diplomatic circuitry. These revisions are included in the final report (page 7, Attachment B).
4. Neither DD/I, DD/OC, nor I anticipate the NSAM 300 report will present any problems to CIA operations. CIA action on NSAM 300 is completed.

25X1



SPECIAL ASSISTANT
DD/S&T

Attachment A: Referenced Memo
Attachment B: NSAM 300 Final Report

cc: D/DCI/NIPE w/atts
DD/I w/atts
DD/OC w/atts

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64-50511

22 JUL 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NP/E
Special Assistant to DD/S&T

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1. The DCI and I have discussed the matter of Ambassador Thompson's interagency group which is being convened to review plans and formulate recommendations under NSAM 360. As covered in the attached letter, [redacted] is designated to represent the Director on this group.
2. Mr. McCone and I will expect you two gentlemen to work closely with one another on this and related matters in connection with NSAM 361 as well.
3. I am particularly anxious to ensure that all interested components of the Agency, including those in DDP and DDS, render each of you as much support as you may require and that you will feel free to keep these components abreast of your efforts.


(Signed) Marshall S. Carter

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Director

Attachment

cc: Executive Director
DCI/Elder
DD/I
DD/P
 DD/S&T
DD/S
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

May 17, 1965

SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: NSAM 300: Review of Alternative
Communications, Navigation, Missile
and Space Tracking and Data Acquisition
Facilities

Pursuant to NSAM 300, the enclosed report and recommendations is submitted.

It was prepared by a working group composed of representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator, NASA, the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Executive Secretary, NASC, and the Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications. It has been concurred in by them on behalf of their agencies.

The Central Intelligence Agency was kept apprised and participated as appropriate.

John P. Walsh
for
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Report and Recommendations.

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Report in Response to National Security Action
Memorandum No. 300: Review of Alternative
Communications, Navigation, Missile and Space
Tracking and Data Acquisition Facilities

This report and program recommendations are submitted
pursuant to NSAM 300 of May 19, 1964 (Tab A).

The National Security Action memorandum calls for an analysis of the continuing need for installations in overseas areas identified by the Secretary of State as politically unstable or unreliable and the development of contingency plans against the event that such facilities become unavailable for further U.S. use. Specific program recommendations are called for.

Because contingency alternatives will ordinarily involve a net degradation in our operational effectiveness, this report assumes we would resort to them only after all appropriate efforts had been made by the U.S. Government, in diplomatic and other channels, to retain the primary facilities in question.

1. Designation of Areas Requiring Contingency Planning:

In the broader sense only Western Europe, Canada, Australia and New Zealand offer a comfortable degree of certainty of continuing availability for the U.S. overseas facilities concerned.

For the purpose of this report, the problem has been limited (a) to consideration of contingency plans for those

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Downgraded at 12-year intervals

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countries so unstable or unreliable that it may be desirable or necessary to remove these U.S. facilities therefrom within the next five years and (b) by eliminating those countries wherein there are no present or planned U.S. facilities, other than those which might be within the physical confines of diplomatic missions.⁽¹⁾

Thus, only the following countries were designated as politically unstable or unreliable for the purpose of this report:

Africa

Ethiopia
Libya
Morocco
Congo⁽²⁾
Ghana

Far East

South Vietnam⁽²⁾
Laos⁽²⁾

(1) While there is no automatic right to operate communications facilities within the confines of diplomatic missions, the withdrawal of such rights would be likely to come only as a concomitant of general limitations on any U.S. governmental activity within that country, unless the U.S. should withhold desired reciprocal rights. No ground-air, fleet broadcast, ship to shore, troposcatter, or relay facilities, but only point-to-point communications are located within Embassy grounds.

(2) Facilities in the Congo, Laos and Vietnam are so directly in support of U.S. efforts to assist these governments there could be no need for contingency alternates.

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Near East

Cyprus
India
Pakistan
Greece⁽³⁾
Turkey⁽³⁾
Iran⁽⁴⁾

Latin America

Chile⁽⁵⁾
Bolivia
Brazil⁽⁵⁾
Peru⁽⁵⁾
British Guiana

Omission of any country from this list does not mean that it is politically stable or reliable as a host for U.S. facilities.

(a) Elements of Risk

Possible reasons for ejection include (a) resentment of U.S. support for another country (Pakistan v. India, Greece v. Turkey), (b) replacement of friendly autocrats (Ethiopia, Iran), (c) advent of a Communist-aligned Government or one susceptible to Communist pressures (Zanzibar), (d) pressures against foreign bases, stemming from increasingly independent attitudes of non-aligned nations, (e) dissatisfaction with U.S. military or economic aid.

(3) Greece and Turkey are included only because of Cyprus.

(4) Iran is included, since so much depends on the Shah.

(5) But as of the date of this report, no longer to be so considered.

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The nature of the facility affects the risk, to some extent, although political climate is the major determining factor. A military communications station, with overt military presence, may be more susceptible than a NASA tracking station or even a LORAN-C navigation aid, but even these may be ejected by an unsophisticated or Communist dominated government, as was the case of the NASA station in Zanzibar.

The risk of sudden ejection, so that operations cannot be continued pending construction of an alternate facility, seems to depend on whether enmity or rancour, rather than a show of independence, is the controlling motive. While the Zanzibar episode did not include adequate advance notice, Morocco provides an example of reasonable delay, and in discussions to date about Wheelus Air Base, the Libyan government has seemed to accept the need for time to relocate.⁽⁶⁾

(6) Assuming a technically and politically feasible relocation site can be found, at least two years seems required to build a new peace-time type alternate or have a major expansion of an existing facility. Fund availability normally involves one year's delay. Technical surveys, inter-governmental negotiations, procurement of special-order items and construction time are also involved.

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It is not possible to quantify the risks of ejection from any single country with certainty, and the attempts made thereat in this report are limited in value. They point the need for continuing and current review, and for contingency planning based upon the fact that ejection might come without notice.

(b) Multiple Risk

It is even more difficult to evaluate the extent of the more remote but still possible risk that facilities might be lost in more than one country within a general region. Something of a chain reaction could result from ejection from one country, and operating rights in two or more countries might be concurrently lost. This could involve a major reduction in land-based communications facilities and a serious degradation of capabilities. This would require, where technically feasible, absorption of the lost functions by nearby facilities (perhaps with some expansion thereof), and the use of available transportable and shipborne equipment to provide austere interim communications pending restudy of requirements and solutions.

2. Analysis of Continuing Need of Facilities and Contingency

Plans:

As provided by the National Security Action Memorandum,

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the responsible operating agencies (the Department of Defense and NASA) submitted their views on the continuing need for the facilities currently located or planned to be located in the areas identified by the Secretary of State, and plans to meet the contingency that such facilities may become unavailable for further U.S. use. Their submissions are at Tab B.⁽⁷⁾

They are subject to the following over-all conclusions:

(a) Communications Facilities: (NOTE: In view of the support provided to significant intelligence-related installations by certain U.S. communications facilities abroad, it is necessary that this report and its recommendations be reviewed by the addressees of NSAM 301 in light of the report being prepared thereunder.)

NASA operates radio communications equipments at each of the South American stations, which tie into commercial circuits outside South America. However, in its world-wide system, NASA relies preponderantly on commercial leased lines.

(7) Any of the alternative arrangements described in Tab B would result in a reduction in our present capabilities. Nothing in this report is intended to indicate that alternate arrangements would be equivalent to present facilities, except when expressly so stated.

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Important Diplomatic Telecommunications System relay facilities exist in Cyprus, Greece, Iran, and Ethiopia. A regional relay facility also exists in Ghana which is presently operating under conditions that make alternate planning desirable. The loss at this time of any of these relay stations would be very significant in terms of the importance of Department of State, Department of Defense and other U.S. agencies' traffic relayed through them.

As a result of the trouble in Cyprus during calendar year 1964, a compensating realignment of diplomatic circuitry has been effected among relay facilities in the Near East, Europe and Africa. Facilities in Greece and Iran are being expanded, and actions expected to lead to the construction of a new major DTS relay facility in Southern Europe are underway. The latter facility is intended to replace the station in Accra and greatly increase our emergency capability.

The loss of any one relay facility at this time could be compensated for by realignment of circuits among the other relay facilities in the Near East, Africa, and Europe. For a period of time there would be a degradation in service. When the expanded stations in Greece and Iran and the new European facility are completely operational, the loss of any one relay

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facility could be absorbed by realignment with limited degradation in service.

Requirements for permanent Defense communications facilities are based on the need for secure reliable and rapid two-way contact with U.S. military elements deployed abroad. The system is designed to serve both the anticipated wartime and the current needs. The major functions served by these facilities are:

1. Supporting the long-haul traffic of the Defense Communications System.
2. Ground-to-air and air-to-ground communications for command and control and flight safety of aircraft in flight.
3. Land based fleet broadcast and ship-to-shore communications for command and control of naval vessels.
4. Land based army communications for command and control of field elements in the area.
5. Nuclear weapons command and control.
6. Administrative and logistic traffic.
7. Major intelligence facilities located abroad.

Communications systems which might eventually obviate the need for relay stations are still of inadequate certainty for

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first line reliance. While satellite systems hold distinct promise for direct communications from headquarters to field commands ashore and afloat and also between the latter, such a capability awaits the development of a military satellite communications system. The present Initial Defense Satellite Communications Program (IDSCP) is of a research and development nature and leads toward an experimental system in 1966. The Department of Defense feels that it may be desirable to augment the IDSCP with additional launches, beyond the three developmental Titan III's presently scheduled, to meet increased U.S. and allied R&D needs and minimum NCS operational needs. An Advanced Defense Satellite Communications Program, initiated in November 1964, could lead to an operational capability beginning in 1968. The effect of these new developments on the need for permanent overseas relay and other facilities, keeping in mind the steadily expanding pattern of our communication requirements over recent years, should therefore be susceptible of more meaningful analysis toward the end of the five-year period concerned.

Three aspects of the communications systems involved provide a certain amount of flexibility in the event of ejection but prior to the establishment of alternate land based permanent facilities:

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- 1) A certain amount of redundant capacity exists within the over-all system, though not covering all missions or all of any one mission.
- 2) Emergency operations might be continued by utilizing air transportable communications units or seaborne communications gear.
- 3) Other stations in the vicinity might be expanded to cover part of the lost function.

There is on hand mobile/air-transportable Army, Navy and Air Force communications equipments which would provide an austere capability for limited temporary circuitry as a "stop gap measure" in the event of ejection without notice, in the general areas of and adjacent to the Mediterranean, Red and Arabian Seas, pending acquisition of alternate facilities.

(b) Navigation Facilities

We anticipate progress over the next five years in LORAN-C contour mapping, and in the operation of satellite and OMEGA navigation systems. These developments will not eliminate the need for the LORAN-C system as such, and the question whether an alternate site would be required, were any particular station lost, would still have to be based on the strategic/tactical

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importance of the station affected. We would nevertheless expect these developments, and the possible procurement of reserve station-sets which is now under consideration, to make us gradually less dependent upon particular stations in areas which may from time to time become politically unstable. In the interim, with respect to stations in countries currently designated as unstable, we conclude that the expenditure of funds now for permanent alternate facilities is not warranted by the risks of eviction, considering both the likelihood of our having adequate advance notice for relocation and the operational problems which would arise if we had no such advance notice.

(c) Missile and Space Tracking and Data Acquisition Facilities

As of the date of this report and in light of developments since this study started, Brazil, Peru and Chile need not be considered as politically unstable or unreliable for the purposes of this report. However, since the changes occurred during the period of this study, the approach applied has been included in this report.

Those facilities falling within this category which are located in countries designated as unstable presented a

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different problem in that interim or mobile facilities would be largely or totally incapable of performing assigned tasks. The NASA stations in Ecuador, Peru and Chile, are to a certain extent, interrelated in function, and while the loss of any one would have serious effects, delaying various programs, the loss of both the Ecuador and the Chilean station would make OAO and OGO support impossible. Therefore, based on current programs, immediate action would have to be taken to replace either or both of the latter stations if ejection is probable, assuming two years as being required from funding to operational status. Location is of critical importance for the performance of the functions of these stations, which, for technical reasons, could not be assumed with an acceptable degree of satisfaction by existing stations or by mobile or transportable equipment.

With respect to Department of Defense facilities, if serious risk of loss were anticipated for the period of this report, steps would be needed to prepare (1) a ship-tended alternative for the Fernando de Noronha Missile Impact Location Station and (2) if substantial risk of loss were expected to arise within two years, an alternate land-based site for the

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geodetic satellite tracking facility at Sao Paulo.

The Department of State, taking into account the views of a Working Group of CIA, DIA and Department of State representatives (Tab C), believes that the risk of losing any of the specific facilities in Ecuador, Peru or Chile within the next five years is relatively small. Similarly, it is believed that the risk of losing either of the Defense facilities in Brazil over the next two years (the outside duration of requirements) is relatively small.

In view thereof, no specific action is recommended at this time with regard to alternate facilities of this nature, although the matter should be kept under continuing review by the responsible agencies.

3. Program Recommendations

1) Current practices for obtaining and using advice on the risk of ejection from such facilities abroad should be improved, expanded and developed into standing procedures so that:

a. The Department of State, on the basis of a full exchange of information with the other agencies will provide current and timely advice on the risks;

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b. Responsible agencies will consult with the Department of State to obtain political advice on all future planning and programming of such foreign facilities;

c. Responsible agencies will ensure: (1) that proposed investments in facilities abroad have taken into account the continuing nature of the requirement and the political risk and (2) that adequate contingency capability is provided to the extent required to prudently meet operating responsibilities in light of the risk.

2) The U.S. Government should give appropriate consideration to research and development of operational communications satellite systems to meet, in accordance with Executive Branch policy, the various needs represented in the National Communications System. In particular, the Department of Defense should give appropriate emphasis to research and development of a satellite communications system to meet military requirements which would be suitable not only for point to point use but also for use with small mobile land and sea-based antennas, less than 15 ft. diameter, useful in the relay and broadcast mode, as unit equipment for deployment with tactical units. The number of satellites in the system should appropriately reflect the contingency requirement covered by this report.

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Index to Attachments

TAB A - NSAM 300, May 19, 1964

TAB B -

B1 - Letter from Mr. Dryden to Ambassador Thompson,
June 30, 1964

B2 - Letter from Mr. Frutkin to Mr. Kitchen, August 21,
1964

B3 - Letter from Mr. Lang to Mr. Kitchen, July 29, 1964

B4 - Letter from Mr. Lang to Mr. Kitchen, August 22,
1964

B5 - Letter from Mr. Lang to Mr. Kitchen, September 3,
1964

TAB C - Letter from Mr. Cline to Mr. Hughes, November 13, 1964

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